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The Senate and Senator Joseph R. McCarthy
FRANK J. KENDRICK
Moorhead State College

1

A study of the United States Senate's reaction to the activities of the late Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy, of Wisconsin, based on the premise that the Senate, operating under its present
rules of procedure, is both incapable of and unwilling to deal with demagogues within its
midst. The nature of the censure that was reluctantly imposed upon Senator McCarthy was
for only the most trivial offenses, lending support to the author's premise.

In the entire history of the United States Senate, there
have been only five cases of official censure of members.
The first was the case of Senator Timothy Pickering
(Massachusetts), in 1811, who read to the Senate in
open session a secret letter from the French Government to the American Minister in Paris. For this action,
he was censured for a "palpable violation of the rules"
of the Senate (Upham, 1873:IV, 175).
In 1850, Senator Foote of Mississippi drew and
cocked a pistol when approached angrily on the Senate
floor by Senator Benton of Missouri. A select committee
declared both Senators to be at fault, condemned their
actions and warned them not to repeat such offenses in
the future.
In 1902, Senators Tillman and McLaurin, both of
South Carolina, started a fistfight on the Senate floor
after a verbal battle of insults. The Committee on Privileges and Elections recommended censure of both for
"their breach of the privileges and dignity" of the Senate (Haynes, 1938: I, 188). (This particular resolution
was, incidentally, the only such resolution ever to contain the word "censure.")
In 1929, Senator Hiram Bingham of Connecticut al. lowed a clerk on his office staff, who was actually a paid
lobbyist for the Manufacturers' Association of Connecticut, to attend the secret hearings of a committee considering the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill. After an investigation by a group studying lobbying activities, the Senate
passed a resolution condemning Bingham's conduct as
"contrary to good morals and senatorial ethics." (Congressional Record, 1954: C, Part 10, 13001).
Finally, in 1954, the late Senator Joseph Raymond
McCarthy, of Wisconsin, was censured for actions that
were contrary to "senatorial traditions" and "senatorial
ethics," and "tended to bring the Senate into dishonor
and disrepute" (Congressional Record, 1954: C, Part
12, 16392). Specifically, McCarthy was condemned for
failing to cooperate with the Subcommittee on Privileges
and Elections which had inquired into his activities in
1952, and for attempting to undermine the integrity of
the committee that was created to consider all the resolutions introduced to censure him in 1954.
1
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The McCarthy affair, as well as the other censure
cases, demonstrates that the United States Senate is virtually incapable and unwilling to deal with McCarthytype individuals within its midst. What is needed is either
some kind of more effective leadership in the Senate, or
a more adequate code of procedures or rules to govern
individual and committee conduct. At the present time,
however, there is no likelihood whatsoever of the Senate's voluntarily meeting either of these needs.
In the following pages the background of the censure
of Senator McCarthy will be considered and some observations on the Senate reaction to his activities will be
presented. First, McCarthy's role in the Senate will be
described briefly in order to show its importance as a
source of his power and influence. This will be followed
by an examination of the Senate's reaction, with particular emphasis on the partisan responses to his activities.
The response of the Executive Branch of the government will also receive attention as the President, too,
played a significant role in the Senate reaction to McCarthy. Finally, a few concluding observations will be
offered on censure and the general nature of the Senate.
The Role of Senator McCarthy

The value of using Communist subversion in government as an electoral issue was reportedly first suggested
to Senator McCarthy by Father Edmund Walsh, regent of
the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown university.
The occasion was a dinner meeting at the Colony Restaurant in Washington on January 7, 1950, at which
McCarthy met Father Walsh, Professor Charles Kraus,
also of Georgetown, and William Roberts, a Washington
attorney. During the course of the conversation, the Senator raised the problem of what to use as a campaign
issue in the forthcoming elections. Roberts proposed the
St. Lawrence Seaway as one to gain Midwestern votes.
McCarthy rejected it because it did not have enough
"sex appeal" and suggested a Townsend-type pension
plan for elderly Americans. This was rejected by the
others, and Father Walsh, in turn, suggested the issue of
Communist infiltration in government. McCarthy's eager
response was, "That's it. The government is full of Communists. We can hammer away at them" (Rovere,
1959:123; Anderson and May, 1952:172-73). Roberts
warned that any such campaign would have to be based
on facts since the public was tiring of "wolf, wolf!" cries
about "pinkos" and "reds" in the Government. McCarthy replied offhandedly that he would get the facts.
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But, as it turned out, all three of his dinner companions
felt compelled to repudiate him within a few months,
precisely because he did not hold to the facts.
McCarthy's career as our leading "Communist-hunter"
can conveniently be divided into two distinct phases.
During the first, from February 1950, until January
1953, McCarthy relied primarily upon his ability to capture the headlines since he lacked formal power to investigate persons or spend· public funds for his activities. Some measure of his success during this first phase
is indicated by the fact that within three years he had
become one of the outstanding political figures in the
United States.
The second phase began after the Republican victory
of 1952. As ranking Republican member of the minor
Committee on Government Operations, McCarthy became chairman not only of that group but, also, of the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which possessed virtually unlimited power to investigate all aspects of the Executive Branch of the federal government. It was the immoderate use of this legal power
which accounted, more than anything else, for his censure in December 1954.
McCarthy's first use of the Communist issue can be
dated exactly as February 9, 1950, when he delivered a
speech on America's "enemies from within" to the Ohio
County Women's Republican Club at Wheeling, West
Virginia. It should be pointed out that, historically, this
particular speech came just 19 days after the conviction of Alger Hiss for perjury, two months after Chiang
Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese Government was forced
to flee to Formosa, five months after the first Soviet
atomic bomb explosion, 15 days after the arrest of
Klaus Fuchs in England for sending atomic secrets to
Russia while working in New Mexico, and only ten days
after President Truman ordered the commencement of
work on the hydrogen bomb. It was a time of fear, suspicion and confusion, in which the American people
were. unusually receptive to accusations of subversion
and spying in the Government.
The Wheeling speech should be examined in some
detail because it set the basic pattern for McCarthy's
activities in the next five years. Although his accusations became much more specific, particularly during
his chairmanship of the Government Operations Committee, nonetheless he tended to conform to the following pattern:
First, he set forth the premise that all the great problems of American foreign relations could be explained
in terms of "enemies from within." He claimed that the
United States had declined as a world power since the
end of World War II, not because of outside threats,
"but rather because of the traitorous actions of those
men who have been treated so well by this Nation"
(U.S. Congress, Senate, 1950: 1765. The following
quotations are from the same source).
Secondly, he singled out the Department of State
where "the bright young men who are born with silver
. spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been the
most traitorous." He mentioned a number of specific
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examples of "traitors", including Alger Hiss and John
S. Service, and then went on to inake his famous claim
that "I have here in my hand a list of 205-a list of
names that were made known to the Secretary of State
as being members of the Communist Party and who
nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in the
State Department." This claim was changed two days
later in Salt Lake City to "57 card-carrying Communists", and in the Senate, on February 20, to "81 cases
with a definite Communist connection." Whatever the
number, however, the basic assertion that Communists
were making U.S. foreign policy remained the same.
Thirdly, he singled out Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was thereafter to be a favorite subject of attack for three years. Acheson had, unfortunately, been
a friend of Alger Hiss and had defended Hiss' character
in the 1949 perjury trial. To McCarthy, the Secretary
was thus a "pompous diplomat in striped pants, with
a phony British accent", who represented the "traitorous", Eastern school, "cookie-pusher", State Department crowd responsible for selling the country down the
river at afternoon teas and cocktail parties. It was this
crowd that, to McCarthy, was weakening the United
States with "powder-puff" and "lace hanky" diplomacy.
To McCarthy, the American people needed a kind of
"bareknuckle" foreign policy that consisted of "spotting
the enemy and then proceeding to destroy him with no
holds barred", as he explained in a later speech (The
N.Y. Times, June 15, 1951:3).
Throughout his "Communist-hunting" career, McCarthy continued to capitalize upon issues of American
foreign and defense policy. It is the use of these particular issues which, to a great extent, accounted for both
his success and the respect accorded him by some of
his colleagues. Within a few weeks after the Wheeling
speech, McCarthy picked up the question of foreign
policy errors in the Far East and linked this with the
issue of subversion in the State Department. In fact, for
at least three years, his implication that Communist subversion had caused the fall of China was the most important charge that he made and accounts for support
of his activities from the late Alfred Kohlberg, a leader
of the China Lobby. McCarthy's preoccupation with the
China issue also explains his violent attacks on Owen
Lattimore, whom he called a "top Russian espionage
agent."
The Korean War, which started on June 25, 1950, also afforded an extremely good opportunity to criticize
foreign policy. Although he did not accuse the Administration of starting the War, he did imply that the failure
of the United States to win was the result of a "HissAcheson-J essup-Lattimore-Vincent plan" to turn all of
Asia over to the Communists. Moreover, the recall of
General MacArthur in April 1951, was, to McCarthy,
accomplished "by a sinister, many-headed and manytentacled monster . . . conceived in the Kremlin, given
birth to by Dean Gooderham Acheson . . . consisting
largely of the old Hiss crowd which still controls not
only our own foreign policy but, . . . now also controls
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the military policy and military strategy of this nation"
(Congressional Record, 1951: xcvn, Part 4, 5772).
McCarthy's famous attack on General George C.
Marshall in June 1951, shows not only the Senator's
interest in the China issue (Marshall was accused of
helping to give China to the Reds), but also his interest in other matters of foreign policy. Among other
things, he attacked the Marshall Plan because it did not
emphasize military aid and was "almost identical" to
a plan proposed by American Communist leader Earl
Browder. He also criticized the British Labor Government, which, to him, usually agreed with Moscow, and
accused Dean Acheson of being more loyal to Socialist
London than the United States.
Other objects of the Wisconsin Senator's attacks were
homosexuals in the State Department, President Harry
Truman ( although he usually qualified his remarks by
saying that the President was a "captive" of the Acheson-Hiss crowd), the Voice of America, East-West
trade, the Army, Harvard University, the United Nations, and "influence-peddling" in the Government. In
fact, out of 17 separate investigations conducted by the
Permanent Investigations Subcommittee while Senator
McCarthy was chairman, only something like five were
not directly connected with subversion and American
foreign and defense policies. Although the broad issues
with which Senator McCarthy was concerned during his
five-year "Communist-hunting" career remained the
same, the emphasis upon specific questions changed between the first and second phases of his career. Under
the Democratic administration, it was acceptable to attack the President, Secretary of State, Chief of Staff
and other top officials, simply because they were not of
the same political party. As will be shown later in this
paper, this kind of attack was popular with many leading Republicans and even led to the use of McCarthy
as a spokesman for his Party in the 1952 campaign and
at its National Convention. After November 1952, however, a few changes in McCarthy's direction and techniques can be noted.
For one thing, his new chairmanship of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee gave him the kind
of access to the Department of State, Army and other
agencies, which he could use to great advantage.
For another, he felt some compulsion to refrain from
attacking members of the new Republican Administration. He did not denounce President Eisenhower, at
least until after he was censured, and he avoided direct
criticism of the Secretary of State and other officials
concerned with foreign and defense policy. At the same
time, however, he continued to investigate State Department agencies and criticize American foreign policy and, ultimately, to conduct a probe into the Army.
These activities, and particularly the latter one, finally
brought him into open conflict with the President. The
right to investigate Federal agencies could also be abused
if taken advantage of, and it is obvious that McCarthy
did just this. Thus, it can be said that Senator McCarthy's own ambition, which he refused to moderate to
any appreciable degree, was by far his worst enemy.
62

The Senate's Reaction to Senator McCarthy
To examine thoroughly the Senate's reaction to McCarthy's activities between 1949 and 1955, would be
an extremely difficult task. For one thing, it was a
highly detailed reaction, consisting of literally hundreds
of facets that can barely be sampled, let alone summarized, with any degree of completeness. For another
thing, it was largely made up of the individual reactions of approximately 150 Senators (since there was
about a 50 per cent turnover in the McCarthy period)
who, themselves, acted often with little recollection or
even understanding of what they did, or why they did
so. It would be virtually impossible for any person or
group to trace all of those reactions that occurred during the five-year period under study. Finally, the researcher, even today, meets a surprising amount of hostility when he attempts to find out what Senators did at
particular times. The following are quotations from two
letters that the author received from important colleagues
of Senator McCarthy.
The first is from an outspoken Republican critic of
McCarthy's activities:
I have made it a practice in recent years not to discuss the McCarthy issue. The Congressional Record and
the press contain my opinions as they were and still are.

The second is from a Democratic member of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee:
Normally I try to grant interviews to all individuals
who in my opinion are working on worthwhile projects.
However, I do not intend to answer questions concerning a subject I do not consider worthwhile, and merely
for the purpose of criticizing the activities of the late
Senator McCarthy.
It should be noted that these responses were received in
January 1960, over five years after the censure.
Given the limitations, however, it is still possible to
describe certain reactions that can be distilled from the
public records of the McCarthy era. The best way to
proceed is to distinguish between the Democratic and
Republican responses.
The Democrats were naturally the first to react to
McCarthy's accusations because it was their party that
was initially blamed for letting Communists work in
the State Department. Their first action was to call for
an investigation of the charges by a Subcommittee of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Unfortunately,
this investigation was poorly organized, incomplete and
openly partisan in nature; although the Subcommittee
condemned McCarthy's charges as "false", it failed to
convince many Republicans or Democrats at the time.
A view commonly expressed then was, "Where there is
so much smoke, there must be some fire." In other
words, McCarthy might be exaggerating the situation,
but there surely must be some substance to his charges.
The Democrats were also responsible for investigating
McCarthy's activities in the 1950 Tydings-Butler election contest in Maryland. This particular investigation
was conducted by the Subcommittee on Privileges and
Elections, which found that a vicious, "back-street" kind
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of campaign that made allegations about the Senator's
loyalty, had been conducted against Senator Tydings,
with the assistance of McCarthy and several members
of his staff. Tydings lost the election to Republican Butler but the Subcommittee was unwilling to question the
election results since there was no evidence of actual
fraud. There is little doubt that many of McCarthy's
Democratic colleagues were much impressed by the results of this particular campaign and a similar one in
Illinois in which Majority Leader Lucas lost to Republican Dirksen. It could be surmised that Tydings and Lucas, who had both been responsible for the first investigation of McCarthy's charges against the State Department, lost their elections because of the new and frightening issue of subversion.
After this, the Senate Democrats were understandably
more cautious in their opposition to McCarthy. This
caution explains their failure to unify in support of the
third investigation of McCarthy's activities, begun in
1951, again by the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections. This time, the Subcommittee acted in response
to an attempt by Senator Benton of Connecticut, to have
McCarthy expelled from the Senate for his intervention
in the Maryland campaign and "various other activities."
These "other activities" included such things as committing perjury before the Tydings Subcommittee, accepting
bribes from a prefabricated housing corporation while
a member of a Senate housing committee, hoaxing the
Senate with his charges against General Marshall, employing questionable persons on his office staff, and
many others. After a year and a half of work which was
highlighted by resignations from the Subcommittee,
countless attacks on it by McCarthy and others, repeated
refusals of McCarthy to testify, and isolation by the
Senate Democratic leadership, a report was finally produced which did nothing more than ask some interesting
questions about McCarthy's background. The Subcommittee made no recommendations and its report was
shelved after the Republicans took over leadership of
the Senate in January 1953.
From this time on, it was the official Democratic policy in the Senate to regard McCarthy as a "Republican
problem." With only a few exceptions, the Democrats
did very little to antagonize McCarthy after 1952 and
the Senate records are almost devoid of Democratic
criticisms. The only important exception was a unified
boycott of McCarthy by the Democratic members of
the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee. Senators
McClellan, Symington and Jackson resigned from the
Subcommittee in July 1953, after McCarthy refused to
dismiss his controversial executive director, Dr. J. B.
Matthews. Matthews had written an article for the American Mercury in which he asserted that "the largest single group supporting the Communist apparatus in the
United States today is composed of Protestant clergymen" (Matthews, 1953: 3). The publication of this article aroused the indignation of a great many people,
including President Eisenhower and Senators of both
political parties. The Democratic members of the McCarthy Subcommittee subsequently refused to end their
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boycott until January 1954, when they secured the power to veto the hiring and firing of staff personnel. In effect, the boycott was of little consequence, but it did
demonstrate that a concerted minority could actually
force Senator McCarthy to moderate his domination of
his Subcommittee.
Most of McCarthy's Republican colleagues, on the
other hand, demonstrated peculiarly ambivalent feelings
toward his sensational charges. While they were interested in what he had to say, particularly in so far as
he continued to criticize Democrats, the large majority
refrained from openly giving McCarthy either their support or endorsement.
As an election issue, Communist subversion in the
State Department was ideal for a party that had been
out of power since 1932. Even before McCarthy seized
upon it so eagerly, the party leadership had considered
using the issue in the campaigns of 1950. The Republican National Committee and Congressional Conferences
jointly issued a "statement of principles and objectives",
just three days before McCarthy's Wheeling speech in
February 1950, which contained the following reference
to the internal security problem:
We condemn the failure of the Administration to recognize the full implications of this threat to our security [from Communism]. We deplore the dangerous degree to which Communists and their fellow travelers
have been employed in important Government posts,
and the fact that information vital to our security has
been made available to alien agents and persons of questionable loyalty. We denounce the soft attitude of this
Administration toward Government employees and officials who hold or support Communist attitudes (The
N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1950:20).
Thus the stage was set for the campaigns of both 1950
and 1952.
One of the first Republicans to recognize McCarthy's
potential value to the Party's electoral efforts was Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. Taft did not at first endorse
his Wisconsin colleague's work but in March 1950, he
announced that while McCarthy's charges were "not a
matter of party policy," he had personally urged McCarthy to continue to press them (The N.Y. Times,
March 23, 1950: 1). The 1950 campaign subsequently
saw the use of the Communist issue in at least 18 Senatorial contests and McCarthy's personal intervention
in at least eight.
In 1952, the stage was set by Senator Richard Nixon,
who had told the National Young Republican Convention in Boston in June 1951, that the party needed "the
kind of a fighting, rocking, socking campaign that will
bring home to the people the merits of our candidate
and our program" (Mazo 1959:85). Administration
"softness" on Communism was to be considered as a
central part of the party campaign and Senator McCarthy was again designated as a leading spokesman.
In addition to his own Wisconsin campaign and the
national contest, McCarthy intervened personally in the
contests of at least 15 of his Senate colleagues in 1952.
It was reported in The New York Times that Republi63

can candidates were "practically falling over each other"
in requesting his personal assistance (The N.Y. Times,
April 27, 1952, IV:10).
In 1954, however, after the Army-McCarthy controversy began, the Republican National Committee decided not to use McCarthy as an official electioneer. National Chairman Leonard Hall declared in April that
only persons who "wholeheartedly support the goals,
aims, and the legislative program" of the Administration would be assigned places in the campaign (The New
York Times, May 7, 1954: 10). It is to be noted that
this decision was made before the televised Army-McCarthy hearings began, which indicates that leading Republicans had become disenchanted with their Wisconsin
electioneer quite early in the year. After this, a number
of Republican Senators and state party organizations
cancelled McCarthy appearances; the records show that
he intervened personally in only five Senatorial contests.
Thus, his role as party electioneer was finished in the
same year that he was censured.
Within the Senate itself, the Republican reaction to
McCarthy's activities was even less noteworthy than
that of the Democrats. As pointed out previously, the
large majority of Republican Senators preferred neither
to oppose nor endorse their Wisconsin colleague's work.
Prior to the censure dispute, only about a dozen Republicans were ever openly critical, and of these, seven
signed the famous "Declaration of conscience" of June
1950. (This document was, incidentally, one of the most
critical statements of McCarthy-type activities ever made
by Senators of either party.)
Without naming Senator McCarthy, the Declaration
accused "certain elements of the Republican Party" of
taking advantage of the current confusion "in the hopes
of riding the Republican Party to victory through the
selfish political exploitation of fear, bigotry, ignorance,
and intolerance" (Congressional Record, 1950: XCVI,
Part 6, 7895). The Declaration called upon all people
to stop "being tools and victims of totalitarian techniques-that, if continued here unchecked, will surely end
what we have come to cherish as the American way of
life" (Ibid.). The document was composed by Senator
Smith, of Maine, and signed by Senators Tobey, Aiken,
Morse, Ives, Thye and Hendrickson. It was all but forgotten, however, in the heat of the 1952 election campaigns.
On the other side was a very small group of Republicans who openly endorsed McCarthy's activities. This
group included only Senators Taft, Smith ( of New Jersey), Wherry and Welker, who specifically declared
themselves to be in agreement with McCarthy and his
charges. A number of other Republicans, although using the Communist issue to advantage, stopped short of
actual endorsement of McCarthy's charges.
Typical of the most common Republican view is this
statement by General Eisenhower in August 1952, only
three months prior to his election:
I am not going to support anything that smacks to
me of un-Americanism-that is un-American in character, and that looks to me like unjust damaging of repu64

tation where the man has not the social recourse to law.
At the same time . . . I definitely buy one thing; I
will certainly support those persons who will uproot
anything that is subversive or disloyal in the government
(The N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1952:8).
This statement is representative of the typical Republican view on the McCarthy situation. In this instance,
the General was speaking for a group, both within and
without the Senate, that regarded Senator McCarthy as
a valuable electioneer who had discovered a winning
issue, but who was nevertheless not to be associated
with personally.
But, both his colleagues in the Senate, and the Administration, soon tired of McCarthy's endless charges
in 1953 and 1954. From the beginning of the Republican Administration the main tasks of the party's leaders were, first, to prevent an open break between the
President and McCarthy and, second, to maintain some
semblance of party unity. Concerning the first task, the
leadership was successful only until the great Army-McCarthy controversy broke out in the first months of 1954.
And this initial success was due in great part to the
compromising attitude of the President himself. President Eisenhower consistently refused to deal in personalities or even mention McCarthy by name. He regarded
the Wisconsin Senator's activities as the responsibility
of the party's Congressional leadership and did very
little more than encourage, usually informally, the Senate leaders in their dealings with extremists.
The ·President became somewhat more actively involved in the dispute, after his first year in office, when
he defended the integrity of the Army from McCarthy's
charges and, finally, in March 1954, he selected Vice
President Nixon to denounce McCarthy's tactics. The
denunciation consisted of the following well-known
statement about Communists:
Well, I'll agree they're a bunch of rats, but you must
remember this. When you go out to shoot rats, you have
to shoot straight because when you shoot wildly it not
only means that the rat may get away more easily, you
may make it easier on the rat.
But you might kill someone else who's trying to shoot
rats too. And so you've got to be fair (The N.Y. Times,
March 14, 1954: 44).
Obviously referring to McCarthy, although not by name,
the Vice President also had this to say:
Men who in the past have done effective work exposing Communists in this country have, by their reckless talk and questionable method, made themselves the
issue rather than the cause they believe in so deeply
(Ibid.).
In the President's view, this was evidently enough criticism because he never publicly denounced Senator McCarthy or his activities again.
There is considerable evidence to conclude, however,
that even the President's limited intervention into the
McCarthy situation did have a great deal to do with
the success of the censure movement. By implication,
at least, the President had placed himself squarely on
The Minnesota Academy of Science

the anti-McCarthy side, and had thus provided encouragement to other Republicans who were willing and
eager to do something.
The introduction in July 1954, by Republican Senator Flanders, of Vermont, of a resolution calling for
the removal of McCarthy from his committee chairmanships, was the factor that ended all efforts to maintain
Party unity in the Senate. This move came just at the
end and as a direct result of the televised Army-McCarthy hearings which had thoroughly discredited McCarthy in the eyes of many of his colleagues and a large
part of the public. The Republican leadership regarded
the first Flanders resolution as a "mistake" and, with
the opposition of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, Flanders moved to have McCarthy censured instead. Thus began the movement that finally culminated
in censure in December.
As for the Republican leadership's role in the ensuing controversy, there is no evidence that either the
Majority Leader or anyone else on the Policy Committee took any official action. The Majority Leader, Senator Knowland of California, declared in July that although he would vote against censure, he had "come to
the conclusion that with the amount of discussion that
has been going on up to this point it may be just as
well to have a full-dress debate" (The N.Y. Times, July
31, 1954:4). On the Democratic side, too, the official
view, according to Minority Leader Johnson, was that
the Flanders resolution was a "Republican problem."
Moreover, the Democratic Policy Committee announced,
just before the debate commenced in the Senate, that
every Senator "should vote his convictions without regard to party affiliation" (Congressional Quarterly Weekly, 1954, XII: 31,979).
The story of the Watkins Committee's investigation
is much too well known to describe here. But it should
be noted that in choosing the members of the committee
every possible effort was made to find six respected, conservative Senators with no previous involvement in the
McCarthy controversy. The objective was, of course, to
secure an "unimpeachable" group, and the appointment
of Senators Watkins, Carlson, Case (South Dakota),
Johnson (Colorado), Stennis and Ervin demonstrates
that by and large the objective was attained. Another observation that should be made is that after the investigation the Senate postponed consideration of censure
until after the elections of 1954, which indicates that
there was still a great deal of sensitivity to the issues
that McCarthy had raised.
The vote on the final draft of the censure resolution,
which came, incidentally, after only 13 days of Senate
debate, is indicative of both the partisan nature of the
McCarthy issue and the internal division of the Republican Party. In favor of censure were all Democrats
present at the time. Of the three absentees, only one,
Senator John F. Kennedy, failed to indicate any position by pairing, while the others paired in favor of the
resolution. As for the Republicans, 22 voted in favor,
22 voted against, and 2 more were paired against the
resolution. Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, was the only
Journal of, Volume Thirty-two, No. 1, 1964

Republican who failed to indicate a position. (It should·
be noted that Senator Kennedy was then in the hospital
and Senator Wiley, in Europe.) The Republicans were
largely split along regional lines: all but four voting
against censure were from the Middle West or West,
and almost all of those in favor of censure were from
the East. Thus, the censure position conformed in general to the traditional East-West division of the party.
With the end of the censure controversy came also
the end of both Senator McCarthy's influence in and
Republican leadership of the Senate. When asked afterward what he thought of the censure, McCarthy replied, "I don't feel I have been lynched" but,
Well, it wasn't exactly a vote of confidence ... I'm
happy to have the circus ended so I can get back to the
real work of digging out Communism, crime, and corruption (The N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1954: 14).
The records show that he never returned to what he
considered to be his mission in the Senate.
Conclusions
The most obvious conclusion to be made from any
consideration of the available records of the McCarthy
era, is that no heroes emerged from the struggle. A few
people, including several Senators, had considerable influence on the censure movement but their actions were
certainly not what might be called courageous. Probably the most notable individuals were the following:
President Eisenhower, who finally defended the Army
from McCarthy's attacks; Senator Benton of Connecticut, whose expulsion resolution started an important investigation of McCarthy's activities; Senator Gillette of
Iowa, who chaired the Privileges and Elections Subcommittee while it was investigating McCarthy; Senator Tydings of Maryland, who bore the brunt of some of the
Wisconsin Senator's most vicious attacks; Senator Lucas
of Illinois, who was responsible for launching the Tydings investigation; Senator Flanders of Vermont, who
introduced the first censure resolution despite pressure
from his party leadership; and, finally, Senator Watkins
of Utah, who chaired the censure committee despite his
ostracism from the Republican Party. There is some evidence, although it is not conclusive, that Senator Lyndon Johnson also played an important role in the controversy by unifying the Democrats in support of censure. Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine that any of
those individuals will be long remembered for opposition to Senator McCarthy.
In retrospect, then, it can be said that the most important aspect of the McCarthy episode was not that
the Senate acted against him, but that the Senate and
its members, did nothing to McCarthy for nearly five
years. The failure to act against McCarthy can be largely
blamed upon the Senate's customary procedural framework which permits individual members a tremendous
latitude within which to operate. Here one can see the
effects of three great principles of Senate procedure;
conservatism, reciprocity and seniority.
As a conservative institution, the Senate is extremely
averse to changing the internal procedures that have
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been accepted as adequate after many decades of use.
It is this aversion to change that safeguards the fundamental right of "unlimited debate" which allows members to use the Senate as a rostrum from which to say
almost anything they desire. They are limited only by
Rule XIX which forbids a Senator to use words imputing unworthy conduct to a colleague or offending a State
of the Union. Moreover, members of Congress also enjoy the privilege of immunity that exempts them from
being questioned about anything they say on the floor
or in committee.
Reciprocity is the principle by which a Senator helps
a colleague when he is able and receives payment in
kind. This principle also works in reverse in that a
member will refrain from blocking a colleague and ex;pects similar acquiescence in return. The effects of reciprocity are seen in many aspects of McCarthy's activities, particularly after he became chairman of his Subcommittee. For example, it prevented members from
limiting appropriations to the Government Operations
Committee in both 1953 and 1954. To limit McCarthy's
request for money would have created a dangerous
precedent for use against other Senate investigating
committees. As Senator Lehman of New York, an unusually outspoken Democratic opponent of McCarthy,
explained to his constituents in 1954:
I have consistently maintained a very clear distinction between the methods and tactics of [McCarthy]
and the general objective of investigating matters properly coming before Congress.
The Committee on Government Operations is a duly
constituted standing committee of the Senate.
I would not, by my vote, refuse all appropriations to a
legally constituted Congressional committee ( Congressional Record, 1954: C, Part 2, 1538-39).
The principle of reciprocity also explains a good many
other failures of the Senate to do anything to limit McCarthy's activities.
The seniority principle, to a great extent, governs the
distribution of power and influence in the Senate. In
general, the most influential Senators are those who
have been there the longest. A notable feature of the
entire McCarthy episode was the failure of the senior,
southern Democrats and mid-western Republicans to
say or do anything. Most of the outspoken opposition
came from northern Democrats and eastern Republicans, who were also more apt to be the junior members
of the Senate.
Not only were the southerners and midwesterncrs less
inclined to disagree with McCarthy openly, but they
were also the ones who tended to benefit the most from
the seniority principle. Coming from the "safe" electoral districts, these members secure most of the good
committee chairmanships and are thus much more inclined to protect the prerogatives of committee chairmen. McCarthy's powers as committee chairman were
not exceptional-he only used them somewhat more
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recklessly than most of his colleagues. Thus, he, himself,
benefited from the seniority principle.
There were so many opportunities to stop McCarthy
in the Senate that one actually wonders why anything
was done at all. In fact, the censure itself amounted to
naught because the records show that McCarthy abated
his attacks largely on his own volition. The censure was
little more than the culmination of a generally developing disaffection with the Wisconsin Senator's charges.
A rapid drop in McCarthy's popularity outside the Senate some six months before, as evidenced by the public
opinion polls and the loss of a number of important supporters, testifies to this fact.
Why, then, was he actually censured? The following
are offered as suggested reasons: (1) The constant criticism of a few outspoken opponents drew senatorial attention to McCarthy's activities. (2) The Army-McCarthy dispute, particularly after it was shown on television, helped to create a senatorial and public reaction
against McCarthy. (3) The intervention of President
Eisenhower in 1954 did a great deal to create the crucial Republican schism leading to censure. ( 4) McCarthy's attacks on his colleagues, including some of the
most respected and influential members of the Senate,
antagonized conservatives who usually remained aloof
from the affair. (5) McCarthy's uncompromising personality and personal ambition served to alienate those
who were willing to work against censure.
The indications are that the latter was far the most
important reason for censure.
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"Throughout this province [Cathay] there is found a
sort of black stone, which they dig out of the mountains,
where it runs in veins. When lighted, it burns like charcoal, and retains the fire much better than wood; insomuch that it may be preserved during the night, and in
the morning be found still burning. These stones do not
flame, excepting a little when first lighted, but during
their ignition give out a considerable heat. It is true
there is no scarcity of wood in the country, but the multitude of inhabitants is so immense, and their stoves and
baths, which they are continually heating, so numerous,
that the quantity could not supply the demand; for there
is no person who does not frequent the warm bath at
least three times in the week, and during the winter
daily, if it is in their power. Every man of rank or
wealth has one in his house for his own use; and the
stock of wood must soon prove inadequate to such consumption; whereas these stones may be had in the greatest abundance, and at a cheap rate."
From THE TRAVELS OF MARCO

POLO, Chapter 23. New York, Criterion
Press.

"The first coal sent from Pennsylvania mines, about
1797, to Philadelphia could not be burned in the fireplaces, and was broken up to repair the streets. A tavernkeeper at Wilkesbarre discovered how it could be ignited by a strong draft, and hundreds of incredulous
people rushed to the tavern to see the rocks blaze."
From Encyclopaedia of Wit and Wisdom,
Philadelphia, S. A. George & Co., p. 248.
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